The Error of Evaluative Statements in Antinatalism

My reason for writing this is to see if I can turn some scrappy thoughts I've been ruminating on into something intelligible. It stems from the debate within antinatalist circles about whether or not antinatalism includes animals. Most (if not all) arguments asserting the inclusion of animals in antinatalism rely on interpreting evaluative assessments about suffering and existence as encapsulating or defining antinatalism (Benatar’s “Coming into existence is always a serious harm¹” being the primary example).

The crux of my thinking is concerned with antinatalists erroneously asserting proprietary claims over such evaluative assessments. I've always had nagging doubts about categorizing them as uniquely antinatalist. They read more like stock standard pessimism to me.

My argument is twofold:
1 Such statements don’t encapsulate and/or define antinatalism, therefore
2 It’s an error to claim they’re sufficient on their own to support the claim that animals are included in antinatalism.

I'll try to make my thinking clear by referencing two videos arguing in favor of animals being included in antinatalism, posted by Tejas Gokhale (April 9) and Lawrence Anton (July 31)².

Both videos tackle the issue by presuming to divide antinatalism into two separate parts, which Anton (mistakenly³) labels evaluative and normative⁴. The evaluative statements are assessments of the worthwhileness of lives vis-à-vis the inevitable suffering of existence from which normative statements can be derived.
Gokhale: (Evaluative) “Coming into existence is bad”; (Normative) “Bringing someone into existence is morally wrong”.
Anton: (Evaluative) “Coming into (a human) existence is a serious harm”; (Normative) “It is unethical to create sentient (or human) life”.

The arguments for including animals are predicated on the evaluative statements, on the basis such assessments don't require moral agents (as the normative statements do), and because the focus is on the beings coming into existence rather than the beings bringing others into existence.

Basically stated, the argument is since the evaluative statements define/encapsulate antinatalism, and they apply to animals, animals are therefore included in antinatalism. A syllogism might look something like this:
P1 Evaluative statements such as Benatar’s “Coming into existence is always a serious harm” define/encapsulate antinatalism.
P2 Evaluative statements such as Benatar’s “Coming into existence is always a serious harm” includes animals.
C Antinatalism includes animals.

I contend this approach only succeeds if the evaluative statements are uniquely antinatalist, begging the question: What do I mean by uniquely antinatalist evaluative statements (UAES)?

I define a UAES as a statement which is only used to derive (normative and non-normative) antinatalist type conclusions and which can't be used to derive not-antinatalist type conclusions. Truth be told, I suspect this is an empty set. The easiest way to illustrate what I mean is to show evaluations which can be used to derive both antinatalist and not-antinatalist conclusions, eg
- Life is suffering.⁵
- “The world is a MALIGNANTLY USELESS potato-mashing network.”⁶
- “They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more.”⁷
- “Life is so terrible, it would have been better not to have been born. Who is so lucky? Not one in a hundred thousand!”⁸
- “The optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all possible worlds; and the pessimist fears this is true.”⁹
- “To bear children into this world is like carrying wood to a burning house.”¹⁰

These statements can be used to derive antinatalist type conclusions, but as they can also be used to derive not-antinatalist type conclusions, they therefore neither define nor encapsulate antinatalism in any sense.

Let's consider three variations of Benatarian type evaluations antinatalists typically regard as UAESs:
1 “Coming into existence is always a serious harm.” (Benatar¹¹)
2 “Coming into (a human) existence is a serious harm.” (Anton)
3 “Coming into existence is bad.” (Gokhale)

I contend these evaluations are of the same type as the above listed examples. They can be used to derive antinatalist type conclusions but they aren't UAESs because they can also be used to derive not-antinatalist type conclusions¹². A hedonist could use the statements to argue in favor of a duty to increase the pleasures of life to offset the harms of coming into existence. An efilist would use them to justify the obligation to end sentient suffering by annihilation of all sentient beings. A buddhist could use them to justify acceptance of the Four Noble Truths. A pessimist(ic optimist?) such as Jordan Peterson can use them as a foundation for teaching about meaning, overcoming, and responsibility.

In his discussion with David Benatar, Peterson made it clear from the outset, "I don't have any disagreement with the idea that the claim that life is suffering is a valid claim. That isn't the point of disagreement. I think that there's been a broad consensus reached at the deepest levels of human thought that there's an existential conundrum that's associated with being and that the conundrum has two elements. One is the implicit tragedy of being which seems to be a consequence of the limitations of conscious creatures like ourselves, that the built-in limitations that are associated with mortality and suffering. And so you could think of that as the tragedy of life. And then the second category of suffering is a consequence of the malevolence that also seems to be part and parcel of human interactions and human existence. Malevolence is something I would say that's not—The tragic element of being is something that you can also point out as characterizing the lives of animals. The additional subjection to malevolence whether it's our own personal malevolence or the malevolence of others I think is something that's uniquely human. So the fundamental existential problem is suffering and malevolence and I think that there's been broad consensus reached, as I said, at the deepest levels of human philosophical and theological thought that those are problems of an overwhelming magnitude. But it's the conclusion that's derived as a consequence of that observation that I have my problems with¹³."

Then at 21m33s: “I'm not disputing the fact that life is tragic and that people are subject to malevolence, let's say. What I'm disputing is your claim that the fact that that's the case means that you can move to the next position in your argument and to argue that being as such is something that should not exist. So we have to stop arguing about whether or not life is suffering because I'm already willing to make that claim. I'm even willing to accept the claim that it's asymmetric in favor of suffering… (If) what you're doing is saying that there's an asymmetry in favor of suffering, okay, that's fine. I also believe that. But to move beyond that and say that because there's an asymmetry in favor of suffering that being is something that isn't justifiable, doesn't follow from that premise.”

Peterson emphatically agrees with Benatar’s assessment to the extent he’s prepared to grant an asymmetry in favor of suffering, and he freely acknowledges “there's been broad consensus reached at the deepest levels of human philosophical and theological thought that those are problems of an overwhelming magnitude”. Benatar never challenges Peterson about being an antinatalist by virtue of the fact he agrees with such evaluations. But those who say Benatar's claim is sufficient on its own to define/encapsulate antinatalism, are compelled to say Peterson's an antinatalist and all such evaluations should be categorized as antinatalist. This is patently absurd. Peterson’s about as far from an antinatalist as one can get and it can't be the case that life is suffering type evaluations define or encapsulate antinatalism. Antinatalism must therefore be something other than these kinds of evaluative statements.

Peterson takes pains to clarify it's the antinatalist conclusions antinatalists derive from life is suffering type evaluations that he has problems with, which speaks against those kinds of evaluations being antinatalist in any sense. Furthermore Peterson includes animals under the life is suffering umbrella, in agreement with Benatar (and myself). But would anyone be foolish enough to interpret this as Peterson outing himself as a sentiocentric antinatalist?

I suspect what trips antinatalists up are the words Coming into existence. Benatar’s assessment isn’t meant in the literal sense of The point at which someone comes into existence causes harm/suffering to that person. The phrase “Coming into existence is always a serious harm” is meant in the sense of Harm/suffering is an inevitable part of life. I even contend something like Harm/suffering is an inevitable consequence of being procreated isn’t an antinatalist type statement as it’s expressing the same sentiment. Saying otherwise reduces antinatalism to seeing who can come up with the most poetic expressions.

At the end of the day, Benatar didn’t create a new category of antinatalist type evaluations. Before his book¹⁴ was published “Coming into existence is always a serious harm” was stock standard pessimism. Publishing his book didn’t magically transform that assessment into something uniquely antinatalist. Rather, his asymmetry and related analyses provide argumentation justifying such pessimist type evaluations, from which both antinatalist and not-antinatalist conclusions can be derived.

As such statements can be used to derive not-antinatalist conclusions it's an error to say they define or encapsulate antinatalism or that antinatalism has some kind of proprietary claim to them. Hedonism, efilism, buddhism, and Jordan Peterson have just as much claim to the statements as antinatalism. It’s therefore an error to represent them as antinatalism type statements and to rely on them to say antinatalism includes animals.

Thaddeus Metz makes the point that "Contemporary anti-natalists aim to show that the balance of what is currently deemed moral common-sense among professional philosophers goes in their favour. They claim to be teasing out the unexpected anti-natal implications of principles that are widely held by academic ethicists.¹⁵”

Metz is saying normative antinatalist conclusions are derived from not-antinatalist principles. In other words the premises underlying antinatalist normative conclusions aren't antinatalist. Only the derived conclusions can be categorized as antinatalist. Metz confirmed by email that an evaluative statement such as Benatar's “is not anti-natalist as such, even if it could figure into an anti-natalist position”¹⁶.

Take for example my syllogism for the consent argument. I derive a normative antinatalist conclusion from non-antinatalist statements of fact (P1,P2,P4) and a common-sense non-antinatalist principle widely held by academic ethicists (P3):
Premise 1: Dukkha is an inevitable consequence of being brought into existence.
P2: Humans exist absent purpose sub specie aeternitatis (PSSA).
P3: It's unethical to non-consensually expose people to inevitable dukkha, absent a purpose beyond the dukkha itself (PSSA in this case).
P4: It's impossible to get consent before bringing someone into existence.
Conclusion: It's unethical to bring people into existence because it non-consensually exposes them to the inevitability of dukkha, absent purpose sub specie aeternitatis.

The conclusion is a normative antinatalist statement, but the premises can't be categorized as antinatalist type statements.

CONCLUSION

If my analysis is right
1 Such statements (as ”Coming into existence is always a serious harm”) don’t encapsulate and/or define antinatalism, therefore
2 It’s an error to claim they’re sufficient on their own to support the claim that animals are included in antinatalism.

This voids every argument relying on such evaluative statements to claim animals are included in antinatalism. This doesn't mean animals aren't included in antinatalism. It only means these particular arguments fail. But from what I've seen every argument in favor of animals being included in antinatalism relies on categorizing these kinds of evaluative statements as antinatalist¹⁷.

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1. Benatar, David (2006) Better Never To Have Been, Oxford University Press, p1

2. My analyses of Gokhale’s and Anton’s videos are here and here respectively.

3. Anton’s justification for the division is based on Thaddeus Metz’s statement: “Contemporary anti-natalism is fascinating and important for requiring sophisticated reflection on the evaluative question of how to judge the worthwhileness of lives and on the normative one of what basic duties entail for the creation of new lives.” (Thaddeus Metz (2012) Contemporary Anti-Natalism, Featuring Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been, South African Journal of Philosophy, 31:1, 1-9, DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2012.10751763, pg1). However LA misconstrues Metz. Metz isn’t saying antinatalism consists of two parts. He’s making the point that normative antinatalist conclusions are derived from non-antinatalist principles (cf n7). In an email (Private Communication October 30 - November 8 2023) Metz confirmed interpreting his statement to mean antinatalism is comprised of evaluative and normative parts “conflicts with common usage or usage that would be useful to organize the debate”. Interpreting his statement as Anton does also conflicts with what he says on p2 of the same paper: “Contemporary anti-natalists aim to show that the balance of what is currently deemed moral common-sense among professional philosophers goes in their favour. They claim to be teasing out the unexpected anti-natal implications of principles that are widely held by academic ethicists.”

4. I may also share responsibility for perpetuating this perception. I refer to a similar division here and here. The basic points being made in both videos still stand, but I’m no longer satisfied with how I presented the split. In the first video I didn’t justify why I rejected Benatar’s conclusion as defining antinatalism for two reasons. One, it was an intuition more than something I could verbalize, the nagging doubt I refer to in this post’s opening paragraph. Two, I was aware of strident disagreement with me on this point so I wanted to keep the door open to err on the side of caution just in case I was missing something. In the second video I presented the statements only for the purpose of depicting the two broad schools of thought in antinatalism, not to indicate agreement with such a division.

5. A commonly rendered version of the first of the Four Noble Truths in buddhism.

6. Thomas Ligotti (2018), The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror (kindle edition), p77, https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B079WMRRYV?ref=knfdg_R_pape_pew

7. Pozzo, Act 2 Waiting For Godot, Samuel Beckett

8. Jewish saying. Quoted from n1.

9. James Branch Cabell (1926) The Silver Stallion: A Comedy of Redemption, QUINN & BODEN COMPANY, INC. RAHWAY, N.J., p128

10. Peter Wessel Zapffe, Quoted in Reflekser i trylleglass: stemmer fra vårt århundre [Magical Reflections : Voices of Our Century] (1998), Edited by Haagen Ringnes

11. n1

12. I suspect what trips antinatalists up are the words Coming into existence. However those words aren’t meant in the literal sense of The point at which someone comes into existence causes harm/suffering to that person. The phrase “Coming into existence is always a serious harm” is meant in the sense of Harm/suffering is an inevitable part of life. Even saying something like Harm/suffering is an inevitable consequence of being procreated doesn’t magically transform it into an antinatalist type statement. Saying otherwise reduces antinatalism to word games.

13. Peterson outlines his objections to antinatalism over the course of the discussion with Benatar. Whether or not his objections are viable or not isn’t relevant to this discussion. All that matters here is his recognition that life is suffering type evaluations don’t define/encapsulate antinatalism, and Benatar doesn’t push back on this.

14. n1

15. Metz, Thaddeus (2012) Contemporary Anti-Natalism, Featuring Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been, South African Journal of Philosophy, 31:1, 1-9, DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2012.10751763, pg1

16. Private communication, October 30 - November 8 2023

17. I haven’t attempted to clarify what antinatalist type statements are. I’ve only sought to clarify that particular types of statements aren’t antinatalist. What kinds of statements do in fact define/encapsulate antinatalism is a separate discussion and one worth exploring.

Here are some examples of Benatar defining antinatalism:

• In discussion with Sam Harris: “It's the view that we ought not to bring new people into existence. But I think the view’s broader, that we ought not to bring new sentient beings into existence. So it's not just the view that it's harmful to come into existence but a further view that it's also wrong to bring beings into existence.”

• In discussion with Bruce Blackshaw: “There are obviously different ways of understanding what one means by antinatalism. I understand it as the view that we ought not to be creating new sentient beings.”

• On the Species Barrier Podcast: “Antinatalism can be understood in a variety of different ways but broadly speaking it's an opposition to bringing new beings into existence. That would apply to humans but it would also apply to animals by breeding them for example.”

• On the Thoughtology podcast: “As the name suggests it's the view that we ought not to bring new beings into existence, more specifically more sentient beings, and I suppose the most controversial instance of that would be new human beings.". The presenter then asks, "Would you say it's just preferable to not bring new life in—or there's a strong obligation that it's always morally wrong? Are there any circumstances in which you'd say that it was right?". Benatar responds, "I think it’s in practice always morally wrong... In practice I don't think that any reproduction is justified”.

• “The view that we ought not to create new people.” Benatar, D. Famine, Affluence, and Procreation: Peter Singer and Anti-Natalism Lite. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 23, 415–431 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10073-4 (This definition is only relevant to the context of this paper and not more generally, Personal Communication November 5 2023.)

From these examples we can conclusively determine Benatar considers antinatalism as something other than evaluative statements about the nature of suffering and existence. It’s also not a stretch to say he thinks antinatalism is defined/encapsulated by a normative statement.

Oliver Hallick presents an alternative approach, kind of like a middle ground if you will. See Diagram 1 and Footnote 4.

It could be there isn’t any way to conclusively categorize what an antinatalist type statement is. Perhaps the best we can do is identify statements that aren’t.